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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
For fifty years every effort for a common European 
defense policy has failed. The first indication of EU sovereignty will 
be missions to points of crisis with no U.S. and U.K. forces 
involved. These points are expected to be countries of the former 
USSR in the east of the current EU borders. The EUBAM mission 
on Ukraine-Moldova border proved to have no significant effect 
thus it cannot serve as a model.1  However, through the 2005 
enlargement EU illustrated alternative patterns of sovereignty, 
using its political and economic power. As this proved to be 
catalytic in the Cyprus case, and Greece was directly involved in 
Cyprus accession, it gives a special weight in Greece as an 
intermediary in Moldova’s accession and the consecutive 
Transnistria’s democratisation. 
 
 By intimating the political parties and political system and 
status that currently dominate in Cyprus and Moldova, this thesis 
aims to premise an implementation of Cyprus acquaintance into 
Moldova’s subject matter. Two cases are developed in parallel with 
emphasis given to Moldova, first because this thesis is addressed 
mainly to Greeks who are in any case familiar with Cyprus, and 
second because Moldovan party system and politics have been 
very little explored. Besides, Cyprus is currently advancing to a 
                                                 
1
 Institute of Diplomacy and Global Affairs, Athens 2009 
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positive course that progressively leads to a solution, while 
Moldova still has to find its way. Thus, latest developments in 
Cyprus can serve as model for Moldova. The common 
denominators of the two countries are: the communist factor 
involved in both governments, the efforts to reintegrate the 
secession territories, and links with third countries originated from 
historical vexations. 
 
 The script is unfolded from generic to specific. After 
outlining the countries in brief, basic historical elements are 
apposed in order to stress out the secession of the territories. 
Getting into more specific political grounds the constitutions and 
governments are being analyzed. Extended length is given to 
election contests analysis in order to highlight relations alliances 
and general trends of the political parties, politicians and third 
countries influence. Note that emphasis is given to the problematic 
electoral procedures in Moldova and Transnistria, since they affect 
the electorate heavily. Finally, after familiarization with both political 
landscapes, a premise for Moldova emerges. 
 
 Since the political developments used as references for 
this thesis represent latest political life, there is no relevant 
literature formatted in books. Hence, extensive mass of papers 
have been used to cover the gap.  
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2. HISTORICAL ELEMENTS 
 
 
 
2.1 Outline of Cyprus 
Cyprus is the Mediterranean's third largest island. A former 
British colony it became an independent republic in 1960 after an 
agreement in Zürich and London between the UK, Greece and 
Turkey, and a member of the Commonwealth in 1961. The 
Republic of Cyprus is one of the advanced economies in the 
region, and member of the EU.2 
Hostilities in 1974 divided the island into two de facto 
autonomous entities, the internationally recognized Cypriot 
Government and a Turkish-Cypriot community, causing 210.000 
both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to be displaced for over 30 years.  
The 1.000-strong UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus has served 
since 1964 and maintains the buffer zone between north and south.  
 
The total population of 573,566 is consisted of the following 
ethnic groups: Greeks 77%, Turkish 18% and others 5%. 
Considering religious believes, there are Greek Orthodox 78%, 
Muslims 18%, others 4%. Official languages are Greek, Turkish 
and English.  
                                                 
2
 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/CY.html 
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The election of the new Cypriot president in 2008 served as 
the impetus for the UN to encourage both the Turkish and Cypriot 
Governments to reopen unification negotiations. In September 
2008, the leaders of the two communities started negotiations 
under UN auspices aimed at reuniting the island. The entire island 
entered the EU on May 1, 2004, although the EU acquis applies 
only to the areas under direct government control, and is 
suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots. 
However, individual Turkish Cypriots able to document their 
eligibility for Republic of Cyprus citizenship legally enjoy the same 
rights accorded to other citizens of EU states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Outline of Moldova  
The Republic of Moldova is a landlocked country in Eastern 
Europe located between Romania to the west and Ukraine to the 
north, east and south. The state language is called officially 
Moldovan as it is mentioned in the Constitution, but in the 
Declaration of Independence it was called Romanian. The capital 
and largest city is Chisinau. 
Moldova has a long history as a border state between great 
powers. In the Middle Ages most of the present territory of Moldova 
was part of the Principality of Moldavia, and in 1792 became part of 
the Russian Empire under the name of Bessarabia. Upon the 
dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917-1918 Bessarabia joined 
Romania. In 1940 Bessarabia was occupied by the Soviet Union, 
and in 1944 was split between the Ukrainian SSR and the newly-
created Moldavian SSR. Moldova declared its independence from 
the USSR on August 27, 1991. Despite signing international 
obligations to withdraw, Russian military forces have been 
stationed since 1993 in the breakaway territory of Transnistria 
against the will of the Moldovan Government3. The region has been 
de facto independent after it made a unilateral declaration of 
                                                 
3
 See Neill Melvin, Russians beyond Russia, London. 1994, Neill Melvin, Forging the New Russian 
Nation, London, 1995 
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independence from Moldova and successfully defeated Moldovan 
forces with Russian assistance. 
Having 4,324,250 citizens the ethnic groups of the country 
are: Moldovan/Romanian 78.2%, Ukrainian 8.4%, Russian 5.8%, 
Gagauz 4.4%, Bulgarian 1.9%, other 1.3%. As far as religious 
concerns there are Eastern Orthodox 98%, Jewish 1.5%, Baptist 
and other 0.5%. Like in all CIS states, Russian is widely spoken 
and is the native language for 11% of the population, and 
according to the National Strategy Moldo-Russian bilinguism is the 
reality to be implemented.   
 
Member state of the UN, WTO, OSCE, GUAM, CIS, BSEC 
and other international organizations, Moldova currently aspires to 
join EU4 and has implemented its first three-year Action Plan within 
the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Unlike 
Cyprus, Moldova is not a NATO member but participates in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program since 1994.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 International Disputes 
 
 Cyprus and Moldova have a similar problem in the north 
of their territory. Russian and Turkish armed forces respectfully are 
stationed in a breakaway territory against the will of the legal 
elected government. The unresolved problems remain a source of 
instability on the EU borders, especially the Moldovan case. The 
following two sections introduce historical events contributed to 
disintegration of both countries 
. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Statement by Moldovan Ambassador to Germany, Nicolae, Tãbãcaru, at the conference „Die 
Republik Moldau im europäischen und sicherheitspolitischen Kontex“, Hamburg, June 18-19, 2001 
 
5
 Congressional Research service, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, Steven Woehrel, 
Specialist in European Affairs, April 14, 2009 
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3.1 Cyprus: the Sequence to Partition 
Enosis (union with Greece) was sought by the Greek 
majority of Cyprus since the British arrived on the island. They 
promised annexation of Cyprus if Greece would enter World War I 
on the side of the Allies. The offer was withdrawn when Greece 
declined.  
In 1931 frustration over British apathy towards their 
aspirations led Cypriots to demonstrate in Lefkosia and throughout 
Cyprus. The heavy-handed British response turned the 
demonstrations into riots with several government buildings burned 
down.  
On January 1950 the Church of Cyprus organized a 
referendum with over 96% voting for Enosis with Greece.  
On April 1955 Cypriots formed the military organization 
EOKA. It is generally accepted that EOKA had a target of achieving 
enosis. However, although this ideology reflected in some of its 
members (and chiefly its military leader Grivas) throughout the 
armed campaign, it was not of universal acceptance. It was 
gradually recognized that enosis was politically unfeasible due to 
the presence of the Turkish community and its increasing 
assertiveness. The political arm of EOKA took a more 
compromising approach especially during the later stages of the 
struggle. The idea of enosis was not immediately abandoned 
though. During the presidential campaign for the 1968 elections 
Makarios III said that enosis was "desirable" whereas 
independence was "possible".  
The leadership of AKEL at the time opposed EOKA's military 
action advocating the Gandhiesque approach of civil disobedience 
such as workers' strikes and demonstrations. Unlike its 
predecessor communist party, AKEL was not against Enosis. 
Instead it supported a gradual process starting with a constitution 
and self-government while Cyprus would remain a colony, leading 
to self-determination and Enosis. After the failure of the 
consultative assembly in 1949 to grant a constitution acceptable to 
the Cypriot members, AKEL changed line supporting immediate 
Enosis with no intermediate stages. 
In 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) came 
into existence. It was a rival paramilitary organisation serving 
 10 
Turkish interests. Although infrequent EOKA and TMT targeted 
each other’s members with ferocity revealing its antagonistic will 
from early days. 
Following the treaties of London and Zurich, the Republic of 
Cyprus was proclaimed in 1960. However independence came with 
a complex constitution and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It was a 
security arrangement compromising of a three way guarantee ship 
from Turkey, Greece and Britain that neither would annex the 
independent republic. 
In 1963 the Cypriot president Makarios proposed 13 
amendments to the Constitution in order to solve intractable 
difficulties in filling government posts. Whether this was an attempt 
to foster increasing unity by dissolving legal boundaries between 
communities, or to effect domination of the Turkish Cypriots by the 
majority Greek Cypriots remains controversial. Whatever 
Makarios's intentions, violence erupted between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots and the UN developed peacekeeping mission. The Turkish 
Cypriots are refusing parliamentary participation ever since. 
Intercommunal tensions and sporadic intercommunal violence 
continued forcing most Turkish Cypriots into enclaves throughout 
the island. This led in 1968 to UN-sponsored negotiations to 
develop institutional arrangements acceptable to both sides. 
As Samos and Crete had also gone through a period of 
independence prior to their unification with the mother country, 
many Cypriots also hoped that would be the case with them. To 
date, Enosis in their case has not been achieved. This led to the 
formation of EOKA-B in 1971. A paramilitary organisation followed 
a right-wing nationalistic ideology with the ultimate goal of 
achieving enosis. When Grivas died from heart failure in January 
1974 the new leadership of EOKA-B increasingly came under the 
direct control and influence of the military junta in Athens. On July 
15, 1974 EOKA-B with approval of the Greek Dictator Ioannides 
and the help of the National Guard, launched a military coup 
overthrowing Makarios and installing Nikos Sampson as the 
dictator of Cyprus. The Turkish government responded to the 
change of status quo by invading Cyprus. The result of the events 
of 1974 was the geographic partition of Cyprus followed by massive 
population transfers.  
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After division Makarios secured international recognition of 
his Greek Cypriot government as the sole legal authority on 
Cyprus, which has proved to be a very significant strategic 
advantage for the Greek Cypriots in the decades since. This gave 
de jure sovereignty over the entire island of Cyprus and its 
surrounding waters except small portions that are allocated by 
treaty to the UK as sovereign military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia 
covering about 3% of the island). Negotiations continued in the 
years after 1974 with varying degrees of regularity and success but 
none resulted in a full reunification. On  November 15, 1983 the 
Turkish Cypriot North declared independence and the formation of 
the TRNC, which has been recognized only by Turkey. Both sides 
publicly call for the resolution of intercommunal differences and 
creation of a new federal system (Greek Cypriot position) or 
confederate system (Turkish Cypriot position) of government. 
The latest attempt for reuniting the island was the Annan 
Plan. After Christofias seized power as a president on February 
2008, the UN encouraged both the Turkish and Cypriot 
Governments to reopen unification negotiations, which started on 
September 2008 under UN auspices. Also, at Apr 17, 2005 Talat 
replaced Denktash and pledged to work to reunite the island and 
restart peace talks with Greek Cypriots following a resounding win 
he labeled "a silent revolution."6 
                                                 
6
 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/CY.html 
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2.3.2 Moldova and Transnistria 
The history of the republic of Moldova is the history of two 
different regions that have been joined into one country, but not 
into one nation: Bessarabia and Transnistria. Bessarabia, the land 
between the Prut and Nistru rivers is predominantly ethnic 
Romanian in population and constitutes the eastern half of a region 
historically known as Moldova. 
 
During the second half of the fifteenth century all of 
southeastern Europe came under increasing pressure from the 
Ottomans, and despite significant military victories by Stephen the 
Great, Moldova succumbed to Ottoman power in 1512 and was a 
tributary state of the empire for the next 300 years. In 1792 the 
Treaty of Iasi forced the Ottomans to cede all of its holdings in what 
is now Transnistria to the Russian Empire. An expanded 
Bessarabia was annexed by, and incorporated into the Russian 
Empire following the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12 according to 
the terms of the Bucharest Treaty (1812). The Moldovan territory 
west of the Prut River remained autonomous and in 1859 merged 
with Walachia. In 1862 Alexandru Ioan Cuza was elected prince of 
Walachia and the part of Moldova that lay west of the Prut River, 
laying the foundations of modern Romania. Note that regions were 
handled as different since that time. 
In 1917, during World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
political leaders in Bessarabia created a National Council which 
declared Bessarabia the independent Democratic Moldovan 
Republic federated with Russia. In February 1918 the new republic 
declared its complete independence from Russia and two months 
later voted to unite with Romania, thus angering the Russian 
government.  
After the creation of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government 
moved in 1924 to establish the Moldavian Autonomous Oblast on 
land east of the Nistru River in the Ukrainian SSR. The capital of 
the oblast was at Balta, in present-day Ukraine. Seven months later 
the oblast was upgraded to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR), even though its population was only 30 
percent ethnic Romanian. In 1929 the capital moved to Tiraspol.  
In 1940 Bessarabia was occupied by Soviet forces as a 
consequence of a secret protocol attached to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet 
Nonaggression Pact. On August 1940 the Soviet government 
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created the Moldavian SSR with its capital at Chisinau, by joining 
most of Bessarabia with a portion of the Moldavian ASSR (the rest 
was returned to the Ukrainian SSR). Part of the far northern 
Moldavian ASSR northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia 
(bordering on the Black Sea) were taken from Romania and 
incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, leaving the Moldavian SSR 
landlocked. 
In 1941, German and Romanian troops attacked the 
Moldavian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The Nazis gave Romania, 
their ally, not only Bessarabia and northern Bukovina but also the 
land between the Nistru and Pivdennyy Buh rivers, north to Bar in 
Ukraine, which Romania named and administered as Transnistria. 
This arrangement lasted until 1944 when Soviet forces reoccupied 
Bessarabia and Transnistria. A 1947 treaty formally returned 
Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and Transnistria to the Soviet 
Union, and the previous Soviet administrative divisions and 
Russian place-names were reimposed. 
Stalin's government policy was to Russify the population of 
the Moldavian SSR and destroy any remaining ties it had with 
Romania. Secret police struck at nationalist groups, the Cyrillic 
alphabet was imposed on the "Moldavian" language, and ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians were encouraged to immigrate to the 
Moldavian SSR especially to Transnistria. 
Political self-assertion escalated in the Moldavian SSR in 
1988. The year 1989 saw the formation of the Moldovan Popular 
Front, an association of independent cultural and political groups 
that had finally gained official recognition. It was the belated 
people’s reaction to Stalin’s Russification. Large demonstrations by 
ethnic Romanians led to the designation of Romanian as the official 
language and the replacement of the head of the CPM. However, 
opposition was growing to the increasing influence of ethnic 
Romanians especially in Transnistria where the Unity 
Intermovement had been formed in 1988 by the Slavic minorities, 
and in the south where Gagauz People formed in November 1989 
came to represent the Gagauz, a Turkic-speaking minority.  
The first democratic elections to the Moldavian SSR's 
Supreme Soviet were held on February 25, 1990. Runoff elections 
were held in March. The Popular Front won a majority of the votes. 
After the elections Mircea Snegur, a communist, was elected 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In September he became 
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president of the republic. The reformist government that took over 
in May 1990 made many changes that did not please the 
minorities, including changing the republic's name from the 
Moldavian SSR to SSR of Moldova and declaring it sovereign. In 
May 1991 the country's official name changed to the Republic of 
Moldova. The name of the Supreme Soviet also changed to 
Moldovan Parliament.7 It was a gradual process to democratization. 
During the 1991 August coup d'état in Moscow, Soviet 
Military commanders tried to impose a state of emergency in 
Moldova but they were overruled by the Moldovan government 
which declared its support for Russian president Boris Yeltsin. 
Following the coup's collapse Moldova declared its independence 
from the Soviet Union. 
 
When Moldovan independence came at a price the 
population on the left bank of the Nistru river with its large share of 
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians feared that Moldova’s 
independence might be the first step towards unification with 
Romania. Transnistria already in September 1990 voted for 
autonomy within Moldova in an unrecognized referendum, and one 
year later for independence. The Moldovan government refused to 
recognize Transnistria’s aspirations, and fighting broke out in 
January 1992 causing 300 deaths8. By the time of ceasefire in July 
1992, the separatists had won control over almost all of the territory 
on the left bank of the Nistru and the town of Bender on the right 
bank.9 Moscow agreed to withdraw its Army if a suitable 
constitutional provision were made for Transnistria. Transnistria 
would have a special status within Moldova and would have the 
right to secede if Moldova decided to reunite with Romania. 
 
In general the conflict between the Transnistrian region and 
the centre has two main cleavages: 
• a linguistic (Russian/Moldovan) one, which was fuelled by 
different interests as well as by strong symbolism on both 
sides and which had strong economic implications 
                                                 
7
 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION MARCH 2005 Report by Bjørn T Vagle 
 
8
 Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, September 30, 2008 
 
9
 Another potential secession issue was defused in 1994, when the Moldovan parliament adopted a 
law establishing a “national-territorial autonomous unit” for the Gagauz minority. The region has its 
own elected legislative and executive authorities and would be entitled to secession from Moldova in 
the case of Moldova’s reunification with Romania. 
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• an ideological (Soviet Union/Western democracy) one which 
ran almost parallel to the linguistic conflict10 
 
Since 2001 president Voronin has offered to Transnistria 
fully autonomous status, demanded it accept EU peacekeepers, 
slapped a blockade on Transnistrian goods, and pitched Moldovan 
rejection of NATO to the Kremlin in exchange for Moscow pressure 
to bring Transnistria to negotiations.11 
On November 18, 2008, NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
adopted Resolution 371 on the future of NATO-Russia relations, 
with among other things "urges the government and the parliament 
of Russia to respect its commitments which were taken at the 
Istanbul OSCE Summit in 199912 and has to withdraw its illegal 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed elaboration on these cleavages see Claus Neukirch, Transdniestria and 
Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr, Helsinki Monitor 2/2001 
11
 Infotag 16.04.2001, Russia Was, Is and Will be Moldovas Strategic Partner, Voronin Says.        
Also: www.topnews.in/moldovas-president-follows-putin-model-out-and-back-2145581 
12
 The respective part of point 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration from 19 November 1999 reads: 
”We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian 
forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002.“ 
 
 16 
military presence from the Transnistrian region of Moldova in the 
nearest future."13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 For more background information on the Transdniestrian conflict and the mediation efforts of the 
OSCE see, Klemens Büscher, The Missions to the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine: A Double-
Entry Balance Sheet, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of 
Hamburg/ IFSH (ed.), Stuart J Kaufman, Spiraling to Ethnic war. Elites, Masses and Moscow in 
Moldova’s Civil War, in: International Security 21 (1996), 2, 108-38; Stuart J Kaufman / Stephen R  
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3. CONSTITUTION AND STRUCTURE 
 
 While getting into politics presenting the constitutions is 
estimated essential. Starting from emancipation and analyzing 
thorniness and amendments, the current constitutions emerges. 
The chapter concludes with the current governments proclaim. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Cyprus 
The government type of the official state currently is 
Presidential Republic. The 1960 Constitution provided for a 
presidential system of government with independent executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, as well as a complex system of 
checks and balances, including a weighted power-sharing ratio 
designed to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The 
executive was headed by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish 
Cypriot vice president elected by their respective communities for 
five-year terms and each possessing a right of veto over certain 
types of legislation and executive decisions. Legislative power 
rested on the House of Representatives, also elected on the basis 
of separate voters' rolls. 
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Note that the president is both the chief of state and head of 
government. The post of the vice president is currently vacant and 
reserved for a Turkish Cypriot. The cabinet is constituted by the 
Council of Ministers which is appointed jointly by the president and 
vice president.14 
Currently the House of Representatives has 80 seats. Of 
these 59 members are elected for a five year term, 56 (70%) are 
elected by the Greek Cypriot Community by proportional 
representation and 3 observers representing the Maronite, Latin 
and Armenian minorities, and 24 (30%) supposed to be elected by 
the Turkish Cypriot Community, as provided in article 62(2) of the 
Constitution. The Turkish Cypriot seats in the House remain vacant 
since 1963. Negotiations to create the basis for a new or revised 
constitution to govern the island and for better relations between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been held intermittently since the 
mid-1960s. 
 
The Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983 as the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. They created their own 
constitution and governing bodies and held its first elections. The 
constitution passed by referendum on May 1985. The UN 
recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the 
entire island of Cyprus.15 
In TRNC the President is head of state and the Prime 
Minister head of government and of a multi-party system. The 
presidential election takes place every 5 year. Executive power is 
exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both 
the government and the Assembly of the Republic.  
TRNC leadership refuse to establish the state of affairs 
before the invasion of Cyprus in their attempt to de jure partition the 
Republic of Cyprus. This is described in the report of the UN 
Secretary-General at the time: “The Turkish Cypriot leaders have 
adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve 
having members of the two communities live and work together, or 
which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would 
have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents. Indeed, 
                                                 
14
  http://cdsp.sciences-po.fr/fichiers_elections25_ANG/CYPRUS_ANG 
 
15
 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/CY.html 
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since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and 
geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is 
not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be 
interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The 
result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by 
the Turkish Cypriots”.16 
 
 
 
3.1.2 The 1994 Constitution of Moldova 
Moldova is a Parliamentary Democratic Republic. The 
Constitution of Moldova adopted in 1994, sets the framework for 
the government of the country.  A parliamentary majority of at least 
two thirds is required to amend the constitution which cannot be 
revised in time of war or national emergency. Amendments to the 
Constitution affecting the state's sovereignty, independence, or 
unity can only be made after a majority of voters support the 
proposal in a referendum. Furthermore, no revision can be made to 
limit the fundamental rights of people enumerated in the 
Constitution.  
Under the 1994 constitution Moldova was designated as a 
“presidential-parliamentary republic.” However, since the 
constitution did not adequately define how executive powers were 
to be shared between the prime minister and the president, there 
was a constant power struggle within the executive branch. Efforts 
by President Lucinschi to transform the political system into a pure 
presidential system, while popular with the population nevertheless 
failed to gain any traction with members of Parliament. In an effort 
to derail attempts by Lucinschi to change the constitution, in 1999 
Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution that 
established Moldova as a “parliamentary republic.” These changes 
fundamentally weakened the powers of the presidency and made 
the chief executive dependent on the legislature’s continued 
support to remain in office. The amendments also eliminated the 
                                                 
16
 Quotation from March 1999 report submitted by Cyprus in the framework of the Convention for the 
Protectino of Mational Minorities citing United Nations Secretary General Report S/6426  
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president’s ability to initiate legislation and essentially gave the 
greatest authority to the majority party or group in the legislature.17 
The unicameral Moldovan parliament has 101 seats who are 
elected by popular vote on party lists every four years. The head of 
state is the President who is elected by Parliament, requiring the 
support of three fifths of the deputies (61). He can serve no more 
than two terms, four years each one. The president appoints a 
prime minister after consulting the Parliament, who functions as the 
head of government, and who in turn assembles a cabinet. Within 
15 days from designation the prime minister must request a vote of 
confidence from the Parliament regarding his work program and 
entire cabinet. Legislative power is vested in both the government 
and parliament.  
The position of the break-away republic of Transnistria, 
relations with Romania and integration into the EU dominate the 
political agenda. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Government in Cyprus 
On February 17, 2008 after a two round election procedure 
Dimitris Christofias of AKEL outvoted 53.4 % of the constituency 
and elected President of Cyprus. It was the first electoral victory of 
AKEL without being part of a wider coalition. Christofias took over 
government from Tassos Papadopoulos of the Democratic Party 
who had been in office since February 2003. His Presidency 
started at February 28, 2008. 
 
In the north part of the island, after "presidential" elections 
on April 17, 2005 Mehmet Ali Talat became president of the TRNC 
since April 24, 2005. Ferdi Sabit Soyer is TRNC prime minister and 
heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) in coalition with Foreign 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Turgay Avci. Talat captured 
56% of the vote replacing its 81 year old founder Rauf Denktash. 
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He pledged to work to reunite the island and restart peace talks 
with Greek Cypriots following a resounding win he labeled "silent 
revolution."  In September 2008 the leaders of the Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot communities actually started negotiations 
under UN auspices.18 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Government in Moldova  
After elections held on April 5 2009 the parliament failed 
on twice to elect a president (May 20 and June 3), automatically 
triggering new parliamentary elections. Those elections, which held 
in July 29, dramatically changed the political landscape, with the 
opposition managing to remove the Communists from power, and 
causing a crisis regarding the presidential election which remains 
unresolved.   
An analysis of the attempts to elect a president follows, in 
order to highlight the current volatile political scene. 
On August 8, four parties agreed to create the Alliance 
For European Integration, in order to push the Communists  into 
opposition. The Alliance needs to elect a new president, an 
impossible action without having the support of at least 8 
Communist MPs. It has a narrow majority of 53 deputies while the 
Communists have 48. At least 61 votes are needed to elect the 
new president.  
Thus they managed only to form a government with 
Michael Ghimpu as Parliament Speaker and Vlad Filat as Prime 
Minister. They announced that they would nominate Marian Lupu 
for President. The first Parliament session was boycotted by the 
communists by challenging the legitimacy of Ghimpu's election on 
procedural grounds, but the Constitutional Court decided that the 
election had been valid. Voronin resigned on September 11 and 
became a simple MP, and Ghimpu took over as acting president 
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until the election, and Vlad Filat as Prime Minister. The new 
government is an arduously negotiated power-sharing arrangement 
among the AEI's four parties.  
The Presidential elections meant to take place on 
October 23 postponed for November 10, because according to the 
constitution at least two candidates are needed to run for the 
election.19  Moldovans amended the procedure to provide that if the 
first and second rounds of the presidential election fail, repeated 
elections can be organized. Running for the presidential post can 
be one more candidates. The Communists described the 
amendments as non-constitutional and announced intention to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court. 
During the elections, the PCRM faction boycotted the 
procedure and Lupu got 53 votes by the AIE. Repeated elections 
were set for December 7 were the communists repeated the same 
strategy. According to Moldova's constitution, after two failed 
attempts to elect a president the country now heads for early 
parliamentary elections. Voronin said his party was looking beyond 
the vote, to an early parliamentary election in 2010. 
This is also why they refused to put forward a candidate 
in a bid to force parliament to be disbanded, so that they can 
attempt to gain the three extra seats they need to establish a 
parliamentary majority. They claim they could not support Lupu, as 
the ruling coalition is preparing “anti-social policies” and this is a 
betrayal of the Moldovan working class. 
The two unsuccessful attempts to elect the president 
opened the way for the holding of new parliamentary elections. 
While Moldova’s parliament was last dissolved in July, a new round 
of (third since April 2009) would likely be possible only in 
September or October 2010 
Following the failed vote in the chamber, the parliament’s 
president Mihai Ghimpu announced that the country will hold early 
parliamentary elections. In the mean he ordered a national 
commission to study constitutional amendments to resolve the 
crisis. Constitutional changes include shifting presidential elections 
from parliament to a nationwide vote. The constitutional reforms 
would become effective after a national referendum. 
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Conclusively, one can say that the political scene became 
extremely polarized and regionalized to communists and anti-
communists. In the past communists were controlling both the 
government and the presidency. Now they certainly lost the 
government but retain enough power to block the presidential 
election procedure. On the other hand, the opposition appears to 
be more stiff and organized. The shift of the majority to the anti-
communist side indicates a new era opening in Moldovan politics. 
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4.   CYPRUS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND 
ELECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Cyprus has a multi-party system with three or four strong 
parties who generally dominate the political landscape. By 
scrutinizing four recent election contests we will highlight relations, 
alliances and general trends of the political parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The May 27, 2001 House of Representatives elections  
 
     After this election AKEL's General Secretary Dimitris 
Christofias was elected President of the House of Representatives 
until 2006. For first time in the history of Cyprus a communist 
participated in the government. Besides AKEL, he was supported 
by EDEK and DIKO. 
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     The coalition of those three parties continued after the 
election of Christofias as the House President and fell apart at 
2007. In the presidential elections in 2003 they achieved the 
election of the DIKO president, Tassos Papadopoulos as President 
of Cyprus. Subsequently AKEL became an active part of the 
Cypriot Government with four ministers.  
     AKEL is formally speaking a Communist Party but it is very 
much a Left party with only a core of ideologue Marxists in its 
midst. It supported entry into the EU with certain reservations and it 
is considered as moderately euro sceptic. It supports an 
independent, demilitarized and non-aligned Cyprus, and a federal 
solution of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem. It places 
particular emphasis on rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots 
and it has had and still has good relations with Turkish-Cypriot 
parties. 
The election results are listed below: 
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4.2 The May 21, 2006 House of Representatives elections 
 
These elections were highly affected from the rejection of 
the Annan Plan. At the April 2004 referendum, 75.8% of Greek 
Cypriots rejected the plan, while 64.9% of Turkish Cypriots 
supported it. 20 The impact has been highly divisive and that its 
shadow continues to hang over Cypriot politics.   
 
In terms of referendum results abut the Plan, more than 2/3 
of traditional DISY voters backed a NO vote in spite of its 
leadership’s contrary opinion. Most AKEL voters followed the last-
minute decision to campaign against the Plan. The followers of the 
President’s own party DIKO overwhelmingly voted against the Plan. 
 
Following the rejection by the Greek Cypriots, four DISY 
MPs who had opposed the party line were expelled and a number 
of members willingly resigned. The expelled MPs formed a party 
called European Democracy. In 2005 they merged with New 
Horizons and created the European Party.   
 
            The election results are listed below: 
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4.3 The February 16, 2003 Cypriot presidential elections 
 
A candidate to be elected as a president needs more than 
50% of the votes validly cast.  If none of the candidates attains the 
required majority the election is repeated on the corresponding day 
of the following week between the two candidates who received the 
greater number of votes. The candidate who receives the greatest 
number of votes at these repeated elections is deemed elected.21 
On the January 2003 the incumbent President Glafkos 
Klerides said that he would be standing for re-election in the 
upcoming presidential election, after previously saying he would not 
stand again. Klerides, from the DISY had been elected in 1993 and 
1998 and called for Cypriots to elect him for a further limited 16 
months as President to give him time to try and reach a deal with 
Turkish Northern Cyprus on reunifying the island. He wanted other 
candidates to unite behind him and agree to form a national unity 
government to try and reach a settlement. However this was not 
agreed by his opponents.  
Klerides main opponent was expected to be Papadopoulos 
of the DIKO. He studied law in London was active in PEKA, the 
political section of EOKA. He took part in the London Conference in 
1959 and was one of the two delegates (besides the AKEL 
delegates) who voted against the signing of the London and Zurich 
Agreements. He was also participated at the Constitutional 
Commission which drafted the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus. His long acting political life started at 1970 when he 
elected as an MP.  
Papadopoulos was seen as being more hard line in 
negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots and had previously accused 
Klerides of selling out the interests of Greek Cypriots in 
negotiations. He was backed by AKEL and had been clear favourite 
in the election until Klerides announced he would stand again.  
Klerides campaign was hurt by the decision of his close aide 
and attorney general Markides to also stand in the election as 
independent. Markides was standing as he believed Cyprus 
needed a younger more modern leader than the 83 year old 
Klerides. His candidacy however was seen as likely to split the 
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support of centre-right voters and thus assist Papadopoulos in the 
election.  
The results saw Papadopoulos winning over 51% meaning 
that he was elected in the first round, thanks to the support of his 
own party but also and most importantly thanks to the additional 
support of AKEL and EDEK. The Green Party supported the 
government but did not participate in it.22 
Papadopoulos campaigned on a platform that he would be 
able to secure better deal over the Cyprus dispute. As President, 
he signed the accession of Cyprus to the EU on April 2003. Before 
the Cyprus reunification referendum 2004 on the Annan plan he 
urged Greek Cypriots to vote No, declaring "I received a state, I will 
not deliver a community". His recommendation is considered one of 
the reasons for the referendum's negative result on the Greek-
Cypriot side.  
Papadopoulos was born studied law in London. In the late 
fifties he was active in the political section of EOKA. He took part in 
the London Conference in 1959 and was one of the two delegates 
(besides the AKEL delegates) who voted against the signing of the 
London and Zurich Agreements. He was also one of the four 
representatives of the Greek Cypriot side at the Constitutional 
Commission which drafted the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  
He was elected member of the House of Representatives in 
1970 and re-elected in 1976, 1991 and 1996. In 2000 he was 
elected unopposed President of the Democratic Party during the 
historic electoral congress at which the founder of the Party 
Kyprianou, stood down.  
 The election results are listed below: 
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4.4 The February 17, 2008 Cypriot presidential elections 
Papadopoulos announced in late July that he would run for 
re-election. In early July 2007 the ruling coalition (DIKO, AKEL and 
EDEK) fell apart due to a lack of consensus on a common 
candidate for the presidential elections. AKEL general secretary 
Christofias was proposed as a common candidate by AKEL but 
rejected by DIKO and EDEK, who both supported Papadopoulos' 
bid for re-election, which AKEL took as a reason to leave the ruling 
coalition and seek to purchase its political proportion. Thus both 
Papadopoulos and Christophias contested the election.  
Furthermore DISY supported Kasoulidis a former 
Government Spokesman and foreign minister of Klerides 
administration. He studied medicine at the in France and geriatrics 
in London.  Themistokleous, a former minister of agriculture and 
environment also contested the election. 
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After the first round of the election and the elimination of 
Papadopoulos, the latter's party DIKO, announced its support for 
Christofias (maintaining its anti DIDY attitude) although 
Papadopoulos himself stayed neutral. Christofias had offered three 
ministerial positions in exchange for DIKO's support, including that 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs in addition to the post of President of 
the House of Representatives, while Kasoulidis had offered five. 
EDEK also backed Christofias on the proposal of its Political 
Bureau with 109 members of its Central Committee voting in favour 
of supporting Christofias, five voting against, and two abstaining. 
The Cypriot Orthodox Church leader Archbishop Chrysostomos II 
(anticommunist) backed Kasoulidis. Ecological and Environmental 
Movement supported Christofias. Evroko, ADIK and Matsakis 
announced that they will support neither of the two candidates. 
Themistokleous backed Kasoulidis. 
Throughout the election campaign Christofias pledged to 
restart talks with Turkish Cypriots in order to find a solution to the 
Cyprus dispute and reunify the island. He has also supported the 
closure of the British military bases on Cyprus. 
Christofias became involved in leftist politics early in his 
youth and held several positions with the youth movement of AKEL. 
He studied in Moscow and returned to Cyprus and political life. In 
1988 he  was elected Secretary General of AKEL and served as a 
member of the House of Representatives of Cyprus since 1991 and 
as its president between 2001 and 2008.  
 The election results are listed below: 
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5.  TRNC POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND 
ELECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Politics of the TRNC takes place in a framework of a semi-
presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the 
President is head of state and the Prime Minister head of 
government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is 
exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both 
the government and the Assembly of the Republic. 
The presidential election takes place every 5 years. In order 
to secure outright victory in the elections a candidate has to have at 
least 50% of the votes. Otherwise the two higher voted candidates 
go to a second round one week later and the winner becomes the 
president.  
The political landscape widely changed when the TRNC held 
multi-party parliamentary elections in 1993 removing the long-ruling 
National Unity Party(UBP) in favour of a coalition of the 
Democratic(DP) and Republican Turkish(CTP) parties. However, in 
August 1996  a new coalition was formed between the two main 
rightist parties, UBP and DP, which stayed in power for the next 
eight years. In 2003 the CTP and DP formed a new government 
placing CTP leader Talat as the new Prime Minister. 
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5.1  The February 20, 2005 Assembly of TRNC Elections 
       The CTP won and became the largest bloc in the assembly. 
It is a social democratic political party, founded by lawyer 
Berberoglu in 1970 as an opposition to the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership of Kücük and Denktash. 
In the 1980s CTP's had a pro-Soviet stance. It has a history 
of rapprochement meetings with AKEL. From 1996 the party was 
led by Talat until his election as the president in 2005 succeeding 
Rauf Denktash. After the fall of the communism in Eastern Europe 
and USSR a natural process of change started. The party's leader 
today is Soyer and the party is leaning towards the European 
social-democratic and liberal system. In contrast with the UBP, the 
CTP is for unification of the island and Talat has begun to 
undertake weekly meetings with the Greek Cypriot President 
regarding power sharing, armed forces, land ownership, and other 
problems that would arise in the event of unification of the island. 
The Democratic Party is a center-right conservative political 
party headed by Serdar Denktash son of the ex-president Rauf 
Denktash. 
The CTP president Talat formed the second CTP-DP 
coalition serving as Prime Minister until his election as the second 
TRNC President on April 17, 2005, when he asked CTP Deputy 
leader  Soyer to form a new government. 
The election results are listed below: 
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5.2 The April 19, 2009 Assembly of TRNC Elections 
It was the latest  legislative elections and the UBP won 
44 %. UBP favours the unity of and close relations between 
northern Cyprus and Turkey and supports the de facto 
independence of the former. Hitherto it disagrees and opposes re-
unification with the Greek Cypriots. 
UBP is a right-wing conservative political party. It was 
founded by Rauf Denktash in 1975. It stayed in power from its 
creation until the 2003 elections with the exception of the period 
from 1994–1996.  
UBP favours the unity of and close relations between 
northern Cyprus and Turkey and supports the de facto 
independence of the former. Hitherto it disagrees with and opposes 
re-unification with the Greek Cypriots of the internationally 
recognised Republic of Cyprus. In contrast President Talat is in 
favour of reunification of the island. 
The election results are listed below: 
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5.3 The April 17, 2005 TRNC Presidential Elections 
From 1975 to 2005 President of TRNC was Rauf Denktash. 
He helped found the Turkish Resistance Organization(TMT), 
formed to resist EOKA's struggle to proclaim Enosis and worked for 
the partition of Cyprus. In 1958 he attended the U.N. General 
Assembly on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriots, and advised the 
Turkish Government on the rights of Turkish Cypriots during the 
preparation of the Zürich Agreement, and soon after was elected 
President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. An ardent 
nationalist, he pursued a policy of trying to gain international 
recognition of the TRNC. However, this stance proved to be a 
major stumbling block to reconciliation efforts, and while initially 
supported by the Turkish Cypriot populace it began to work against 
him when the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU. 
In 2005 Denktash retired from the presidency. Talat won the 
Presidential Election becoming the TRNC's second President. He 
resigned as Prime Minister which was taken over by CTP Deputy 
Leader Soyer. He was Minister of Education and Culture in the first 
coalition government formed by the RTP-DP alliance after the 1993 
elections. He undertook the same post in the second DP-RTP 
coalition government, and became Minister of State and Deputy 
Prime Minister in the third DP-RTP coalition government. It was the 
first time that TRNC had a president in favour of reunification.  
During the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan to reunify 
Cyprus in advance of its entry to the EU, Talat promoted a 'Yes' 
vote among Turkish Cypriots and the plan received overwhelming 
endorsement north of the Green Line. However, Papadopoulos, the 
then President of the Republic of Cyprus opposed the plan and the 
Greek Cypriot community rejected it by a large majority. As a 
consequence the plan was dropped.  EU declared it would seek to 
implement trade concessions and other measures designed to 
alleviate the isolation of Northern Cyprus as a reward for the 
Turkish Cypriot referendum result. Talat remains publicly 
committed to reunification.  
The election results are listed below: 
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6.  MOLDOVAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND 
ELECTIONS 
 
Moldova is a multi-party republic with a Unicameral System. 
It is the only CIS member country to have held consistently free 
and fair elections (with the usual insignificant irregularities) from 
1990 to date. Moldova's opposition parties are small and leader-
centred. Most of the opposition parties compete against one 
another for the same segments of the electorate or for overlapping 
segments.23 
Right after democratisation parties came and went, 
constituted alliances and blocs merged and split again. Political 
parties tended to change names with every election and personal 
ambitions of and rivalries between leaders have stood in the way of 
a consolidation of the party landscape. 24  By scrutinizing the last 
decade election contests we will highlight relations, alliances and 
general trends of the political parties. 
                                                 
23
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34733&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHas
h=527a88cdb2 
24
 Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary Election March 2005 Report by Bjørn T Vagle 
 37 
Most Moldovan party labels were and still are meaningless. 
The biggest party for instance is communist in name only. It uses 
that name as an electoral brand attractive to a critical mass of 
voters. Moldova is the only post-Soviet country to have returned a 
communist party to power repeatedly. All the parliamentary majority 
parties and all presidents failed to re-elect until the PCRM 
managed to do so in 2005. Communists were subjected to 
restrictions everywhere in post-Soviet elections but the Moldovan 
Communists competed unrestrictedly. The party gained a plurality 
of parliamentary seats in 1998 and an absolute majority in 2001 
and 2005. It won the 2001 elections on a platform of nostalgia for 
the Soviet period and the 2005 elections on a pro-Europe platform, 
having run afoul of Moscow. In 2009 although it preserved its 
plurality of parliamentary seats, it was not enough to form a 
government. 
Despite the weakness of political parties in Moldova, for 
much of the post-independence era competition for political power 
was waged between two rival factions with distinct policy 
differences regarding the issue of national sovereignty. One faction 
led by ex-President Lucinschi and ex-Prime Minister Braghis 
favoured a strongly nationalistic political course. In the opposition 
camp was a coalition of forces led by PCRM leader Vladimir 
Voronin who favoured closer ties with Russia. The struggle 
between the two factions was antagonistic and hostile throughout 
most of 2000 as neither faction was able to tilt a relative balance of 
power in its favour during initial attempts to elect a new president. 
Only after the 2001 parliamentary elections the power balance 
shifted albeit temporarily in favour of the pro-Russian faction. 
Efforts by the new president to reintroduce compulsory Russian-
language lessons in schools sparked large-scale street protests in 
2002. The largely Romanian-speaking population viewed this 
language policy as a step to bring Moldova into Russia’s influence. 
While the Russian language plan was eventually abandoned, the 
street protests against the government of President Voronin 
escalated after the disappearance of the opposition leader 
Cubreacov. While Voronin threatened the use of force to end these 
protests the unwillingness of either the military and police to carry 
out violence, left the government with little control over the political 
arena. 
 Recognizing the political liabilities associated with pursuing 
a pro-Moscow platform, the Communists since 2002 made a 
complete turnaround and now support greater ties to EU. This 
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policy compromise weakened the factional division in Moldova, 
although the fault line between Russian and European supporters 
remains an important feature of Moldovan politics.25 Despite the 
communist’s majority status, Moldova could not be termed a 
"communist-ruled" or "communist-governed" state. Voronin 
embraced the agenda of European integration in 2004 ahead of his 
party and must often nudge an uncomprehending or reluctant 
parliamentary majority to adopt legislation envisaged by the 
Moldova-EU Action Plan. Many Communist parliamentarians 
grumble but ultimately marched to the EU's tune. This modus 
operandi proved relatively effective thanks to Voronin's dual role as 
head of state and of the PCRM. This turned out to be a basis for 
stability and incremental changes in a destitute provincial society. 
However, the transition process ahead will severely test the 
country's weak political system. 
Note that a big portion of Moldova’s population wants 
reunification with Romania and the EU membership it would bring. 
German reunification is a common topic of conversation. In the 
2009 parliamentary elections opposition parties called for closer 
links, or even a union with Romania.26 
 
 
 
6.1 Flaw Democracy and Electoral Procedures in Moldova 
There is disagreement as to whether elections and politics in 
Moldova are carried out in a free and democratic climate on the 
part of certain organizations.  
The USA Senate has held committee hearings on election 
irregularities, including arrests and harassment of opposition 
candidates, intimidation, suppression and bias of media, in favour 
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of candidates backed by the PCRM. Other critics have also referred 
to the former Communist government as being authoritarian.27 
According to a European Commission comment on the 
Moldovan election law, the Representation Threshold (6%:single 
party, 9%:two-party bloc, 12%:blocs digger than three parties)28 
was high by absolute and comparative standards. The system 
asked voters to endorse a single candidate rather than a party list, 
and then allocate seats in proportion to the electoral strength of 
parties.29 Alliances between political groups were also prohibited 
prior to an election. EU requested a 3% threshold, a widely used 
level for European countries that allows smaller parties to actively 
participate in government. Voronin refused to comply, noting that 
Russia and Turkey amongst other countries maintain similarly high 
thresholds. 
The EU foreign policy representative Javier Solana stated 
that "further improvements were required to ensure an electoral 
process free from undue administrative interference and to 
increase public confidence."30 
According to OSCE opinion opposition parties may not have 
flourished but at least they haven’t been subjected to government 
harassment, and elections over the years have been fair and 
open.31 However, PLD leader Filat complained that some parties 
may be prevented from conducting election campaigns because 
Moldovan law requires political campaigns to last 60 days 
minimum. Due to the February 2 announcement, political parties 
were left with only three days to register if they wished to campaign 
prior to the April vote.32 
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The OSCE Special Co-ordinator Petros Efthymiou, and the 
Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Remler 
encouraged the Chisinau central authorities and the  Tiraspol 
regional authorities to find an understanding that enables Moldovan 
citizens in Corjova to exercise their right to vote.33 Jurisdiction over 
Corjova is disputed. During the 2005 parliamentary elections 
Transnistrian blocked attempts to carry out mobile voting for home-
bound voters. During the 2007 local elections they prevented voters 
from entering the polling station. When repeat elections organized, 
they closed down the polling station by force.  
Also, recently the leadership of the autonomous region of 
Gagauzia became more vocal in its complaints that the Moldovan 
Government does not respect the region's statutory-enshrined 
autonomy.34 
 Assertions also came from abroad. Many of those who 
oppose the Communists are young people who left the country to 
work abroad, and straiten to track down to vote. Considering that 
they can only vote in Embassy buildings makes elections hardly 
accessible to them.35 
Estonian Socialist MEP Marianne Mikko "noted real 
improvements in comparison with the 2005 elections" explaining 
that polling stations officials and voters were fully aware of electoral 
procedures.36 
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6.2 The February 25, 2001 Moldovan Parliamentary elections 
    These elections were conducted in an atmosphere of 
extreme social and economic hardship.37 87%of the electoral stated 
that their income was hardly enough to cover their minimum 
expenses.38  Continuous poverty and disappointment led people to 
vote for PCRM on a platform of nostalgia for the old good days and 
the secure communist environment. 
 
     Transnistrian authorities discouraged participation in the 
elections through different means. As a result, only 1% of 
Transnistrians entitled to vote participated in the elections.39  At this 
time the constitution was changed to provide for election of the 
President through parliament rather than popular vote. The PCRM 
won and Voronin elected president shortly thereafter by the newly 
elected parliament. For the next eight years the balance of political 
power shifted in favor of Russia. Also, it was the first elections 
carried out using the recently introduced 6% representation 
threshold.40 
 
    The high threshold resulted in only three parties winning 
seats. No independent was able to clear the 6% barrier. The fact 
that no proportional representation election produces an exactly 
proportional result is not a justification for maintaining a grossly 
disproportional election law. If a straight 5% threshold had been 
applied and all electors had behaved the same, the relative size of 
parties would have been maintained and the PCRM would still had 
an absolute majority of seats in Parliament. However, there would 
have been five rather than three parties in Parliament and the 
opposition would have had 40 rather than 30 seats, thus enabling it 
to operate more effectively.41 
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On April 4, 2001 Voronin was nominated as President. A 
Romanian engineer-economist, expert in politics and jurist he was 
elected President of the PCRM in 1994. Having served in many 
slots of the Moldavian branch of the CP of the USSR he was 
Moscow oriented. His allies controlled most if not all of the 
country's electronic media, most of the profitable wine factories and 
tobacco plantations and almost all Moldova's top banks, 
construction firms and commodities exchanges.  
 
On April 19, the parliament approved the new government 
led by businessman Tarlev, a Bulgarian engineer and political 
neophyte and not a PCRM member. The PCRM has billed Tarlev’s 
government as a non-partisan government of experts. Only two of 
its members were communists while six were from the previous 
center-right reformist government. Nevertheless, the government 
was entirely dependent on the PCRM’s support.42 In the following 
years they allocated more resources to social safety net items such 
as health, education, and increased pensions and salaries, aiming 
to a social based regime. After 2002 the communists made a turn 
towards Europe when recognized the political liabilities associated 
with the pro-Moscow platform. However, they maintained a two 
vector policy. 
 
The election results are listed below: 
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6.3 The March 6, 2005 Moldovan Parliamentary elections 
 
The PCRM gained 56 seats, more than the minimum 51 
required forming a government but short of the 61 necessary to 
elect a president.  Voronin was therefore re-elected with support 
from the Christian Democratic People's Party(PPCD) and from the 
Democratic(DP) and Social Liberal parties(PSL). 
The PCRM campaign motto was more telling in the Russian-
language version than in the Romanian one about the party's 
evolution: "Let us build together a European Moldova”, advertising 
a shift to a more pro-Europe stance. Program goals included 
negotiating and signing an association agreement with the EU, free 
access of Moldovan citizens and goods to the EU, and resolving 
the Transnistria conflict through a negotiated autonomy status on 
the basis of Moldova's territorial integrity, its continuing neutrality 
and demilitarization.  
The PCRM promised to cooperate with any party that 
supports independency of an indivisible Moldova within Europe 
(code words for non-unification with Romania, reunification with 
Transnistria, and staying out of Russia's orbit). But the party's 
message payed lip service to partnership with Russia in deference 
to a sizeable portion of Moldova's and the party's own electorate. 
The PPCD was militant anticommunists, but entered into this 
parliamentary partnership after Voronin's team adopted a European 
orientation43 and stood up to Russia. The conditional agreement for 
re-electing Voronin was based on 10 points proposed by PPCD. 
These points represented the basic reforms in the Moldavian 
legislation in order to expand democracy and reduce corruption. 
Although the PCRM sometimes vacillated on both counts, the 
PPCD understood the importance of not being isolated and not 
being forced to depend on Moscow-oriented local allies. However, 
this partnership was fateful for the PPCD and caused the complete 
loss of the party’s electorate, when Voronin proved to be 
incongruous to his commitments.   
Only three of the 15 parties vying for seats obtained enough 
votes to enter parliament due to the 6% threshold. Under Moldovan 
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electoral law the remaining 16% of the12 parties vote, redistributed 
among the three parties that won seats.44 
Voronin, Parliament Chairman Lupu, and Prime Minister 
Grecianai took over the first three places on the Communist Party's 
electoral slate. Top presidential adviser Tcaciuc had been 
seconded to coordinate the party's electoral campaign, leading an 
effort to rejuvenate the party in the run-up to the campaign. The 
effort succeeded in elevating a young group to the party leadership 
around Voronin. But the rejuvenation stopped half-way when 
Soviet-era veterans counterbalanced the young element.  
When the PCRM seized power, whereas it promised wider 
democracy, it established an almost dictatorial regime, taking under 
control all the state institutions (Government, Justice, Media, ect). 
During 4 years of the Communist government the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, European Parliament and 
others criticized this government through the adoption of several 
resolutions. However, it favoured European integration and 
eventual EU membership. 
The election results are listed below: 
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6.4 The April 5, 2009 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections 
In December 2008 President Voronin rejected EU 
suggestions to change the country’s election laws. The constitution 
required at that time political parties to receive at least 6% of the 
vote to be represented in Parliament. Alliances between political 
groups were also prohibited prior to an election. 
 
By April, Moldova's already weak economy was in tatters 
because of the world financial crisis, and the country's opposition 
repeatedly hammered the theme that Communist rule was corrupt 
and ruining the country. In the same time the state-run media 
provided biased coverage, trumpeting the virtues of the ruling party 
and selectively airing only negative aspects of the opposition. 
When announced the preliminary election results on April 6, 
which showed the PCRM victorious winning approximately 50% of 
the votes, the opposition rejected the results accusing the 
authorities of falsification of votes counting and demanded new 
elections. Opposition and NGO activists organized protest 
demonstrations in Chisinau indicating people’s anger against the 
unreliable and corrupted PCRM. Voronin called the Constitutional 
Court to authorise a recount of the votes as demanded by the 
protesters. 
On both counts the results were the same: 60 votes for 
Greceanii (poppet president). As 61 seats are required to elect the 
president at least one dissenting vote from the opposition was 
required but never obtained.  Voronin dissolved the Parliament and 
early elections were set for July 29. 
Before the dissolution of the parliament the electoral 
threshold was lowered from 6% to 5% and the minimum 
participation rate was lowered from half the electorate to a third. A 
poll from mid-July gave the PCRM only 29.7%, with the combined 
opposition (including the DP now led by PCRM defector Lupu) at 
over 40%. Voronin did not rule out seeking to enter into a coalition 
with the opposition parties if the election results were inconclusive, 
but nobody wanted to cooperate with him any more. 
 The election results are listed below: 
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6.5   The July 29, 2009 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections 
These elections dramatically changed the political 
landscape. The opposition managed to remove the Communists 
from power and formed a majority government. The parliament 
became extremely polarized having corrupted communists to one 
side, and anger democrats to the other. 
The change started on August 8, 2009 when four parties  
(Liberal Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Democratic Party, and Our 
Moldova Alliance) agreed to create a governing coalition that will 
push the Communists into opposition. The coalition was named 
"Alliance for European Integration". The party’s leaders (Filat,  
Ghimpu, Lupu, Urechean) signed a 22-point declaration in a press 
conference.  
The Alliance joint foreign policy is based on a three-point 
principle. First: European integration, second: resuming good 
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relations Ukraine and Romania, third: strategic partnership with 
Russia. 
     The PCRM gained around 45% of the vote whilst the other four 
parties which won seats each gained from around 7% to 16%. 
However, combined the opposition parties to the Communists 
secured a greater percentage. Also, it was the first time after 
almost a decade that the PCRM lost its plurality of parliament 
seats. This led some commentators to declare the election a loss 
for the Communists. Lupu played a major role when defected to the 
DP lifted up 13 seats in the new assembly. He emerged as the 
preponderant politician of the elections playing a master role in 
both poles. He represents the centre-left and hopes his political 
standing will attract some more traditional communist supporters.  
Eight parties participated in the elections: Four had won 
seats in the April elections (PCRM, PL, PLDM, PAMN), three 
parties had won 3 to 4% (PSD, PPCD, PDM) and the Ecologist 
Party  "Green Alliance", which had not participated in the April 
elections. 
The results of the July election indicate a consolidation of 
the vote with fewer parties standing. In April, 15.19% of voters 
supported minor parties below the then 7% threshold. In July only 
4.16% of voters supported minor parties who fell below the 5% 
threshold. 
 
 The election results are listed below: 
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7.  TRANSNISTRIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
AND ELECTIONS 
 
 
Officially Transnistria is a parliamentary republic with a 
unicameral 43-seat legislature known as the Transnistrian Supreme 
Soviet, although internal politics are heavily dominated by the 
presidency.45 Originally there were two chambers until President 
Smirnov abolished one in 2002 increasing his power to “full 
presidentialism”, while serving as “President” and “Prime Minister” 
at  the expense of legislative power.  The political regime can be 
described as “super-presidentialism”. The president is elected to a 
five year term by popular vote.  
Two so-called civic political movements which could be seen 
as prototypes of political parties were organized prior to the 2005 
elections: Republic(Respublica) and Renewal(Obnovleniye). They 
dominate the parliamentary campaign and represent different 
groups within the ruling elite but are largely united on the core issue 
of independence. 
In general, politics in Transnistria are determined by the 
imperative of its elites to retain power. These elites benefit 
politically and economically from the status quo.46 
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Respublica and Obnovleniye represent competing economic 
interests of the two most powerful clans in Transnistria: the 
Smirnov dynasty and the Sheriff (name of company) conglomerate. 
Smirnov’s power comes mainly from gas money and Sheriff’s from 
lucrative retail and production export. Smirnov owns the regional 
bank Gasprombank (run by his son and wife). Sheriff owns 
supermarkets, petrol stations, and a number of newly privatized 
enterprises including Transnistria’s largest textile plant, with 70% of 
export oriented to the EU.  
There is a debate regarding the position of Obnovlenie in 
regards to Smirnov. Most analysts point to the party's opposition 
status noting that it is not allied with Smirnov, whose party 
Respublica lost several seats to Obnovlenie in the latest 
parliamentary election. However, others claim that the interests of 
the Smirnov clan are represented in all political movements of 
Transnistria including Obnovlenie. 
Sheriff has mainly financial not political power. This is 
changing though with Obnovlenie in power. It is Sheriff’s political 
vehicle for legitimizing and realizing its economic interests. 
Obnovlenie and its young appealing Parliamentary Speaker and 
Chairman Shevchuk are supported and controlled by the Sheriff 
Corporation. Sheriff wants market reform within Transnistria. 
Although Obnovlenie publicly renounced reunification with right 
bank Moldova (at Smirnov’s insistence some say), Sheriff needs a 
conflict compromise (reunification) in order to realize its business 
goals. 
 
Smirnov would like to change through parliamentary vote or 
referendum the electoral system from single constituencies to a 
proportional representation system because he is bracing himself 
for a budgetary crisis. His preemptive strategy is to weaken any 
possible threat of opposition and to deflect socio-economic 
problems onto it. 
 
 A party-list system requires real difference between parties 
and their platforms. It requires a real debate of issues. This is 
where Respublica is strong and Obnovlenie weak. Smirnov is 
popular for his pro-independence stance and pro-Russian foreign 
policy.  Obnovlenie would have to develop a platform on foreign 
policy issues which it currently doesn’t have. Moreover, 
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Obnovlenie’s main goal of market reform is largely unappealing to a 
population accustomed to high pensions and social welfare. 
 
According to the  2006 referendum carried out by the 
Transnistrian government, the population voted in favour of 
"independence from Moldova and free association with Russia."  
However, in 2007 the registration of a Social Democratic Party was 
allowed. This party led by former separatist leader and member of 
PMR government Safonov is allegedly in favour of a union with 
Moldova.  
Εlections in the PMR have not been monitored by any inter-
governmental organization with the exception of the CIS, and they 
have been accompanied by numerous allegations of irregularities in 
favour of the incumbent president. In the latest presidential election 
the registration of Safonov was delayed until a few days before the 
vote, so that he had little time to conduct an election campaign. 
Some sources consider election results suspicious. In 2001, in one 
region it was reported that Smirnov outvoted 103.6%. 
After almost 15 years of non-existence of political parties, in 
a few weeks in July and August 2006 a number of virtual parties 
and political movements were suddenly registered.47 The aim was 
to set a fake multi-party political system while maintaining the 
authoritarian nature of the regime.48 
The ethnic composition of the Transnistrian parliament 
reveals that Moldovans were under-represented in all terms. The 
two other largest ethnic groups (Russians and Ukrainians) were on 
average over-represented. Less than a third of deputies were born 
in Transnistria.49 
Average Transnistrian citizens do not make political party 
distinctions and electoral choices based on ideology (as in Russia, 
see Colton 1998), but according to other frameworks. The line 
between factory and politics is a blurred one. Most major private 
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enterprises are owned or operated by a state or municipal 
politician. The workplace and unions are important sites of election 
campaigning and vote winning. Choices are frequently made 
through collective, unanimous voting in workplaces. Campaign 
practices like gift-giving to constituents are common. Instead of 
being considered manipulative or undemocratic, everyday persons 
regard such practices as ways of remoralizing and domesticating 
an abstract quasi-state. Campaign politics also distinguishes 
people between left and right bank in wider Moldova.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1   The December 10, 2000 Transnistrian Parliamentary 
Elections 
Most of seats were won by independent candidates. Grigore 
Maracuta was elected for a third term as speaker having the 
support of 39 out of 41 representatives present at his election.  
The election results are listed below: 
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7.2  The December 11, 2005 Transnistrian Parliamentary 
elections 
 
     Since the 2005 parliamentary elections the Supreme Soviet 
has been controlled by Obnovlenie. With Ukrainian/Russian 
business interests involved, Obnovlenie is considered a formidable 
challenger to Smirnov and his party Respublica. However, this 
challenge failed when it became clear that Smirnov was firmly in 
control of the levers of influence over politics and the economic 
groups behind Obnovlenie. Control of the intelligence services and 
support from Russia were the key factors which allowed Smirnov to 
reassert his power in the presidency.51  However, Shevchuk 
became Parliamentary Speaker, a position equivalent to prime 
minister one step down from the president of the republic. 
 
During the election campaign local candidates gave gifts to 
people and organizations in an effort to win their votes. Opposition 
leaders claim Obnovlenie’s strategy only worked because of the 
current electoral system. Parliamentary election is currently based 
on a majority system and single constituencies (single-member 
district electoral system). Under such a system individual charisma 
and financial power in constituency areas are important for winning 
(Mosher 2001). In other words Obnovlenie rose to power owing to 
its wealth and the electoral system. 
The election results are listed below: 
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7.3   The December 9, 2001 Transnistrian Presidential elections 
They were won by the incumbent president Smirnov who 
ruled Transnistria since 1991. The other candidates were Zenovich 
mayor of Bender, the second largest city in the country, and 
Radchenko of the Power to the People party which advocated 
reunion with Moldova. 
 Smirnov was born in the USSR and displayed a great 
enthusiasm for Soviet life. He served the Red Army, joined the 
Communist Party and served as a Komsomol organizer after 
returning to civilian life. He served as an assistant director and 
director in factories. There he organized strikes for the self-
determination of Transnistria and got workers of other to. He 
emerged as a leader when Transnistrian politicians and activists 
worked towards sovereignty from the Moldovan SSR in1990. 
 
 He entered into politics when he won two seats in the 1990 
Moldovan elections. After a congress that proclaimed the creation 
of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian SSR he was elected chairman of 
the Provisional Supreme Soviet. 
 
 The election results are listed below: 
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7.4 The December 10, 2006 Transnistrian Presidential elections 
    Incumbent President Smirnov won despite opposition having 
stiffened during the final weeks campaign. Three candidates 
registered to run besides Smirnov: for Obnolveniye - Tomaily, 
Pridnestrovie Communist Party - Bondarenko and journalist 
Safonov. 
   Just a year ago more than half of the electorate voted for 
Obnovleniye. When Smirnov outvoted 82,4% questions for the 
election validness roused. 
      Safonov's candidacy was at first rejected on the basis of 
insufficient and allegedly fraudulent signatures, but on November 
30, the Tiraspol law court accepted it. Despite the court ruling, at 
the Electoral Commission meeting on November 27, Safonov's 
registration was declined with some members claiming that the 
court decision needed to be challenged at a higher instance. The 
Commission finally allowed the candidacy on  December 5. 
    Starting on December 7, early voting was allowed for those 
persons for whom it was impossible to come to the polls on 
December 10. 
 The election results are listed below: 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
    
         Although the two sides of the Cyprus political map have 
been separated for 35 years, they have never been closer to being 
reunited than they are today. Substantial progress is observed on 
the issues of governance and power sharing. The main reason is 
the ousting of the hard-line Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos 
in 2008 and the subsequent election of Christofias, who is a 
moderate and is in favour of reunification and gave the process a 
huge boost. He is also on very friendly terms with the North Cyprus 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat which has enabled negotiations to be 
conducted in a very civilised and polite manner. Both leaders have 
committed to a partnership that will compromise a federal 
government with a single international identity for the benefit of 
Cyprus politics. 
Obviously it is the Turk-Cypriot side that is moving 
towards the Greek-Cypriot. Among many there are three 
distinguishable key-factors through the Cyprus depository: 
• After division Makarios secured international recognition of 
his Greek Cypriot government as the sole legal authority on 
Cyprus. This gave de jure sovereignty over the entire island 
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and its surrounding waters. In contrast TRNC is only 
recognized by Turkey. 
• The entire island entered the EU in 2004, but the EU aquis 
applies only to the areas under direct government control. 
However, individual Turkish Cypriots able to document their 
eligibility for Republic of Cyprus citizenship legally enjoy the 
EU rights. 
• Christofias, a leftist non-nationalist Greek Cypriot President 
seized power. He is originated from AKEL which always had 
good relations with the Turkish Cypriots.  
         While holding solid arms there was no need for Cyprus to 
succumb to the Annan Plan, causing further decay to Rauf 
Denktash and UBP. Finally in 2005 Denktash resigned and UBP 
sank in the Parliamentary elections. For the first time TRNC was in 
favor of reintegration.   
 
Questioning Moldova in parallel to Cyprus one can 
distinguish significant similarities. In both cases there were and still 
are links with third countries originated from historical vexations. 
Russian and Turkish armed forces respectfully are stationed in a 
breakaway territory against the will of the legal elected government. 
Both territories are colonized. Religious cleavages played no 
significant part in secession. When independency was finally 
achieved after long efforts, the sequence to partition together 
started. 
Besides the above mentioned there are three 
distinguishable key-factors through the Moldovan matters: 
• The history of the republic of Moldova is the history of two 
different regions that have been joined into one country, but 
not into one nation, while Cyprus is the history of two regions 
and nations always consolidated in one, and have recently 
disintegrated. 
• Although Transnistria like TRNC is not internationally 
recognized, Voronin offered a fully autonomous status since 
2001, demanding certain returns. 
• Recognizing the political liabilities associated with pursuing a 
pro-Moscow platform, since 2002 Moldovan Communists 
made a complete turnaround supporting greater ties with 
EU. Since the EU-Moldova action Plan was signed (2005) 
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Moldova marches towards EU. The Parliamentary majority 
and the current government have the will to advance further 
to EU integration, while Voronin and PCRM seemed to be 
reluctant. 
             Moldovan problems can be solved undoubtedly through co-
operation with the West under the condition that the country 
strengthen its efforts to play according to the rules and to fight 
nepotism and corruption. The biggest goal is to democratize 
Transnistria. This has become the new Euro-Atlantic strategy for 
ending the status quo and settling the Transnistrian conflict. The 
idea is to affect change from within through increased citizen 
participation, civil/political rights, and political competition.52  
 
              Moldova already aspires to EU integration. If Moldova 
joins EU, first democracy will consolidate and second the 
Transnistrian status will undoubtedly be affected in the mode of 
TRNC. Considering Moldovan political status we may say that now 
is the right time for this perspective.  EU ιin contrary seems to be 
reluctant for further enlargement for the forthcoming years. I claim 
that a long approximate access plan is enough to serve this project. 
That would make the Moldovan political scene looking 
rather normal, with the (mildly pro-Russian) Democrats on the left 
and the (mildly pro-Romanian) liberal bloc on the right alternating in 
government. In terms of foreign policy will continue the tightrope 
walking between the EU and Russia. However, there will be more 
cooperation with the EU avoiding the same time conflict with 
Russia. Relations with Romania will be normalized and Transnistria 
will continue its life as de facto independent state most likely 
federated with Moldova. 
           This stick and carrot policy is already implemented by 
financial actors. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the Council of Europe will tip the new Moldovan authorities with 
US$1.5 billion. Representatives of the financial organizations 
already expressed their readiness to render financial assistance to 
Moldova after their meeting with the leaders of the democratic 
coalition. The promised financial resources can not only cover the 
budget deficit but make big investments in the infrastructure.  
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Moldova’s party system is mature enough now for such a 
change. For much of the post-independence era competition for 
political power was waged between two rival factions with distinct 
policy differences regarding the issue of national sovereignty: 
Nationalistic against closer ties with Russia, also representing 
democratic against authoritarian rule. Since the 2002 turnaround of 
communists towards EU, this factional division has weakened, 
although the fault line between Russian and European supporters 
remains an important feature of Moldovan political participation. We 
may say that Moldovan party system in general, and particular after 
the last year events, shifted to the right to more neo-liberal 
perspectives. 
 
         Moldovan citizens have also changed and claim their 
rights in a more glazed way. They realized their political power. 
This can be justified by the uprising after the April 5 elections. 
Instead, the Russian influence in Transnistria left no room for 
political claims and maturity. It is an undeniable fact that the 
majority of people are not aware of politics and electoral 
procedures, making them prey to furtive politicians will. Also, 
improvements are required to ensure the electoral process free 
from undue administrative interference and to increase public 
confidence. These are key-factors to mobilize Transnistrians 
against authoritarian communists. Sententiously, the question here 
is whether Transnistrian citizens are able to conceptualize and 
exploit an eventual EU and Moldovian opening.  
 
 
 
 
            Although Moldova is a small country with minor strategic 
significance today, it is important to follow events there and to take 
them seriously. It is one of the frontlines of “battlefield” of interest 
spheres between EU and Russia, between U.S. and Russia and 
between future energy political deals.53 It is also a test for 
international law, conflict management and territorial sovereignty. 
Russia has tested strategies there, which it later used in other 
countries and might do so in the future. Transnistria in particular is 
sometimes compared with other post-Soviet frozen conflict zones 
such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. A 
continued lack of interest in the country would also make it easier 
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for Russia to consolidate its control over the country and to 
increase the pressure on Ukraine to follow the same pattern. 
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